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Warm Ideas and Chilling Consequences
Arthur P. Bochner
Abstract In the process of writing my academic memoirs spanning a period 
of more than thirty-five years, I discovered how crucial the work of Gregory 
Bateson had been to my life as a teacher, a scholar, and a relational partner. In 
this paper I celebrate Bateson’s charming and incisive ideas about how com-
munication works, his deep reservations about the worship of quantification, 
and his astute analysis of what is at stake when we make epistemological errors 
in everyday life. Reviewing a turning point in my academic life—a conference 
held in 1979, I reaffirm the importance of warm ideas and provide a story that 
illustrates the potentially monstrous consequences of epistemological error.
If you grow up, as we do, with a worship of the quantitative aspect and a minimal 
attention to the qualitative aspect, I believe you inevitably land yourself in the 
dilemmas of our civilization.
Gregory Bateson (1981)
But I get back to the fact that the way we are going about things with this enormous 
emphasis upon the quantitative view and the minimal emphasis upon the patterned 
view is, I believe, the easiest way of the descent into hell. The surest.
Gregory Bateson (1981)
Prologue
For the past three summers, I’ve been sitting in this chair, writing my academic 
memoirs, trying to make sense of thirty-eight years of academic life. I’m striving 
to tell the story of how I came to the narrative paradigm of social science inquiry, 
moving from being immersed in the epistemology of prediction and control to being 
captivated by meanings and values, desiring to put lived experience in an intelligible 
frame that can enlighten, emancipate, and alleviate suffering (Bochner, forthcoming). 
When I began, I had a familiar storyline in mind: I overcome my modest roots (as 
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the son of a working-class, Jewish immigrant), work my way through a myriad of 
contradictions, dilemmas, and setbacks, and transcend my academic socialization 
(into positivist empiricism). Following a conversion to a new (narrative) paradigm, 
I achieve peace of mind, wisdom, love, and a re-awakening of spiritual and political 
conviction. But the more I wrote—or I should say, the more the story wrote me—the 
more I became aware that I was preoccupied by a struggle to reassure myself that my 
life as a professor had been meaningful, coherent, and principled. I had to resist the 
temptation to exaggerate, cope with the fallibility of language, shore up an unreliable 
memory, and show a healthy respect for the confusion and uncertainty lurking in the 
corners of my recollection of every phase of my life. I realized that what I was doing 
was building a relationship to my past, between the selves of my past and me—between 
there and then and here and now. Like any construction project, this one could not be 
completed without exertion. There would be more than a little sweat on my brow and 
more than a few tears running down my cheeks. I couldn’t just tell my life, I had to 
examine it, mull it over, toss it, turn it, squeeze it, embrace it, doubt it, adore it, and 
trust it in order it to discover, explore, and interpret what I had been thinking, what 
had inspired me to keep going, and what I really cared about. 
Sometime I wonder if I’ll ever finish this book. Finishing a life story is akin to fin-
ishing a life. Can we ever really know how it will end? Do we want to know? 
Nearly every day that I write, I make a new discovery as I look intently on the 
past and try to figure out what it means. For example, writing this book has allowed 
me to revisit my mentors. Recently, I discovered how important the work of Gregory 
Bateson had been to me and I vowed that I would not let his memory die. As far as I 
am concerned, he was the person who first championed the importance of qualitative 
inquiry, at least the first one who got through to me. 
Bateson anticipated many of the culture wars we’ve experienced over the past two 
or three decades. He understood how difficult it can be to introduce change into a rig-
orously governed, rigidly homeostatic system like academic social science. He would 
not have been surprised by the backlash against qualitative inquiry. As one of his 
students, Jay Haley (1963) inscribed as his First Law of Human Relations, “The more 
change is attempted, the more it is resisted.” Haley would have seen the current climate 
of dispute over the legitimacy of qualitative social science (Denzin, 2009) as a power 
struggle, not so much a question of what the rules should be, but rather who gets to say 
what the rules should be (about what counts as legitimate inquiry and methodology). 
At the 2009 International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, I posed a direct ques-
tion about the usefulness of waging war against the enemies of post-structural, post-
modern, autoethnographic, and performative social science. “What do we gain by 
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defending ourselves against attacks on our work by the mainstream qualitative com-
munity or the scientifically-based research movement?” I asked. 
The differences between “them” and us” should be obvious. We don’t have the 
same goals and we don’t have the same core beliefs;. Moreover, given the sphere of 
their influence, they have an investment in perpetuating their own agenda and exercis-
ing a politics of exclusion. We aren’t going to change their minds and they aren’t going 
to change ours. The only possible outcome is something akin to the old CNN program 
Crossfire. It would be like trying to hold a constructive dialogue between FOX news 
and MSNBC? The point I am driving at was made succinctly by Rorty ( 1991, p. 31 ): 
“. . . we cannot justify our beliefs (in physics, ethics, or any other area) to everybody, 
but only to those whose beliefs overlap ours to some appropriate extent.” There is a 
limitation to argument. Without some shared premises, we can’t convert them from 
their point of view to ours. Those shared premises do not appear to exist--not now, and 
not in the foreseeable future.
In this brief paper, I move in a different direction. I return to a turning point in my 
life, harkening back to my first qualitative publication (Bochner, 1981). Much of the pa-
per is conceptual and methodological, but as a narrativist, I can’t resist the temptation of 
a clinching story, especially a true story with a chilling moral. My goal is to circulate again 
the idea of epistemological error and its potentially horrifying consequences. This is one 
of the most important ideas I learned from Gregory Bateson and there’s a lesson here I 
want to pass on to future generations of students of qualitative inquiry across the globe. 
Remembering Asilomar
A graduate student, one of my advisees, comes bounding into my office, grinning from 
ear to ear, looking as if she were a bubble about to burst.
“I didn’t know you were ever that young,” Leslie began in a playful, teasing tone.
“What in the world are you talking about?” I replied, puzzled by her question and 
eager to take the bait.
“I’m taking this course on systems theory with Dr. Steier,” she continued. He 
brought this book to class titled Rigor and Imagination (Wilder-Mott and Weakland, 
1981). He’d already assigned some readings from the book, but last night he showed us 
the photos in it, which were taken at the Asilomar Conference in 1979. We all got a big 
kick out of them. You looked so hip in that leather vest.”
“I suppose you mean that as a compliment,” I reply wryly, looking down at my 
ruffled t-shirt and wrinkled jeans and wondering but not asking why “hip” rarely is 
used either endearingly or critically to describe a person over 50. 
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“Of course, I do,” Leslie assures. “All of us in the class were really amazed to see the 
glow on the faces of the participants. Everyone seemed to be having such a good time. 
The NCA conferences I go to don’t seem to be that much fun.” 
“Well Asilomar certainly was special. Whenever I think of that conference, I’m 
reminded of what Margaret Mead said about successful conferences—the intensity is 
so great you feel as if you’re falling in love. The Asilomar conference was a love feast. 
“What made it so special?” 
“For many of us it was a turning point, or maybe I should say a turning-away point. 
Most of us thought of ourselves as social scientists but we also saw severe limitations 
in the positivist scientific tradition in which we’d been trained. We were searching for 
a different paradigm for communication research, something other than the quantita-
tive, hypothesis-testing model that dominated.”
“Weren’t you aware of ethnography or cultural studies?”
“You have to understand that in the mid-1970s, there was no interpretive social 
science to speak of—at least not in communication studies. Students didn’t do field-
work for dissertations, they did laboratory experiments. There were no cultural ap-
proaches or cultural studies in communication, and the only ethnographic work that 
was encouraged was the narrowly focused ethnographies of speech communities (e.g., 
see Philipson, 1975).”
“How could you not have known?”
“Are you suggesting we weren’t well educated?’ I kid.
“No, but surely . . . ”
“I guess it depends on what you mean by known or being aware,” I interrupt. 
“Yes, we knew about phenomenology and existential psychology and some of us had 
read Wittgenstein (1953), Husserl (1931), and Charles Taylor (1971). We had studied 
the books by Erving Goffman (1959; 1967) and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
(1966), and we knew about the field work originating in the Chicago School of sym-
bolic interaction and the ethnographic tradition in anthropology on which Bateson’s 
early research had been drawn (Bateson, 1937). But what I’m talking about is a sense 
of community--a group of scholars with a sense of a common purpose and common 
goals. There was no interpretive community in the field, no unified sense of purpose 
binding us together or giving us a sense of solidarity.” 
“I take it that’s what you wanted to achieve at Asilomar, a feeling of community.”
“To be honest, it really didn’t start out that way. We knew Gregory Bateson was 
ill and those of us who admired his work wanted to honor his legacy while he still 
was alive. After all, he was the greatest communication theorist of our age. But once 
we started to make plans, we could see this event was going to be much bigger than 
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we had thought. We had underestimated how many young and middle aged-scholars 
were desperately seeking an alternative to the Newtonian model of the academic.”
“I noticed in the pictures that many of the speakers looked like hippies. Was this 
some kind of counterculture of inquiry?
“That’s an interesting observation. A lot of the young scholars and graduate stu-
dents who came were very much like Bateson-- unconventional, resistant to scientific 
orthodoxy, attracted to complexities of living beings, impatient with oversimplifica-
tions and de-contextualized knowledge, alienated by disciplinarity and careerism. Like 
Gregory, we felt ideas were just as important as data and we hungered for occasions to 
talk about the ideas that mattered most to us. Some of us had come through academia 
as members of the 60s counterculture, but again, I’d have to say there was no unified 
culture, counter or otherwise. ”
“But if most of you were outside the mainstream, how were you able to get the 
funds to support the conference?”
“Getting all of us together at Asilomar was really a wild fantasy that Carol Wilder-
Mott turned into a dream come true. She somehow mustered support and endorse-
ment from ICA’s Interpersonal Communication Division, which had never been sym-
pathetic to the sort of work represented by Batesonian communication theory. One 
thing led to another and before we knew it a hundred people were on the grounds in 
Pacific Grove, California. Most of the people who came had never seen or met Gregory 
Bateson and we couldn’t wait to meet him. There was an air of excitement and expecta-
tion, a feeling that this was going to be an historic and memorable event.” 
“Do you think the conference had a lasting impact?” Leslie interrupts. “Did it make 
a difference in how students of communication think about what we do?”
I can’t sit here and say that the conference changed the course of the field. Certain-
ly it did not reverse the domination of Cartesian methodology in communication re-
search. Even today most empiricists in the field cling tightly to the comforting illusion 
of detachment and objectivity. They ignore the brute fact that social scientists live in 
the same world they are trying to understand. We can never stand completely outside 
the phenomena we are studying. Bateson had no tolerance for experimental studies. 
“They strip away context,” he would say, and “without context there is no communica-
tion, there is no meaning.” This is such an obvious point, yet quantitative researchers, 
especially experimentalists, simply ignore it and go on with their meaning-less stud-
ies. The Asilomar conference had no effect on them.
“So the conference didn’t matter all that much in the total scheme of things. Is that 
what you’re saying?” Leslie persists.
“No, I wouldn’t say that, Leslie. I came back from Asilomar very hopeful about the 
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future of a relational and constructivist paradigm for communication research. I know 
others did too. It was the first time I sensed that a community of interpretive social sci-
entists was emerging. I was astonished at how many people I met there wanted to study 
how people make sense of their lives, how communication contributes to sense making, 
and how we can use our research to help people live better lives. Not long after Asilomar 
we began to see a lot of interest surfacing in interpretive and qualitative approaches to 
communication research—work on organizational cultures and narratives, social con-
struction, and personal narratives. Slowly but surely qualitative research gained momen-
tum. When I was offered an opportunity to come to USF and develop an interpretive 
Ph.D. program emphasizing qualitative and ethnographic research, I jumped at it.”
“I’m sure glad you did,” Leslie says. “I don’t know where I’d be without this pro-
gram.”
Bateson on Observed Reality and Real Reality
After Leslie leaves, I can’t stop thinking about the Asilomar conference, about Bateson, 
and about her question: What difference did that conference make? I think about 
how rarely Bateson is cited in qualitative methods journals. He is never mentioned 
as a pioneering interpretive social scientist, and he is largely ignored in books that 
promote a “relational world view” (Gergen, 2009), though his work was instrumental 
in establishing the importance and usefulness of the idea of relationality.
I recall my first introduction to Bateson’s writings in Raymond Tucker’s graduate 
seminar on “Communication Theory” in which he slipped in two essays by Bateson 
(Bateson, 1951), “Information and Codification” and “Where Validity Depends Upon 
Belief,” between Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1962) and Thibaut and 
Kelly’s The Social Psychology of Groups (1959). Bateson used the term “codification” 
to represent the perceptual processes by which we translate events or objects in the 
external world. External events are different from internal representations of those 
events, and codification expresses the way humans transform what is outside internal-
ly, that is, through the process of perceiving, categorizing and interpreting events and 
objects. We think that we think in terms of things, Bateson observed, but we actually 
think only in terms of relationships. “Our initial sensory data,” he wrote (Ruesch and 
Bateson, 1951, p. 169) “are always ‘first derivatives,’ statements about differences which 
exist among external objects or statements about changes which occur either in them 
or in our relationship to them…What we perceive easily is difference and change—and 
difference is a relationship.” Bateson pointed out that when we don’t recognize an ob-
ject, or we’re not sure about what we are seeing, we usually change our relationship to 
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what we are viewing; we move closer to it, we touch it, or we do something to change 
our relationship to the object, giving us a different perspective on it. Our ‘knowledge’ 
is thus contingent on our positionality. 
When we talk about knowing something, we implicate ourselves in what we claim 
to know. Observed reality is always something different from (real) reality because, 
in Bateson’s terms, codification and valuation inevitably transform rather than copy 
reality. Since Bateson considered transformation to be mathematical, the representa-
tion of objective reality that results from all this is the product of an observer’s internal 
computations, that is, the system of codification and evaluation. Since what is known 
has to be codified, what we actually perceive is the product of our perceptions rather 
than something we might call “objective reality.” One could easily regard Bateson’s es-
say as an early statement on what later became feminist“standpoint theory” (see Hard-
ing, 1991, 2004). 
Forming Warm Ideas 
I talked to Gregory Bateson face-to-face only on two occasions, once after a seminar 
he gave at the Temple University medical school in 1974, the other at the Asilomar 
conference in 1979, yet I regard him as the person who most influenced the direction 
and form of my life as a scholar and a teacher. At the Asilomar Conference, I deliv-
ered a paper titled “Forming Warm Ideas” (Bochner, 1981). My goal was to show how 
Batesonian communication theory resonated within me. By warm ideas I meant ideas 
that compel us to move closer to our subject matter, using ideas to extend inquiry 
into new territory and amplifying our understanding beyond what we knew before 
we started.
I emphasized three points about scientific practices: First, that scientific activity 
is recursive. To see phenomena a scientist must transform them; having transformed 
them, he or she is transformed by them; second, that data can not tell us what to ask 
of them, nor what they mean. Thus, the meanings of data are never beyond challenge, 
never closed to other meanings, never capable of absolutely falsifying or verifying. 
What we do to or with data is an intellectual activity; and third, ideas are as important 
as facts and nowhere is it evident that they are inducable from them. We need imagi-
nation not rules; intuition not technique; warm ideas not cold facts; inventive people 
not conformists, fertile thinking not rigid rules to follow. 
If all humans operate on an external world they perceive as real—as the one and 
only world they know--then all attempts to “represent” reality are mediated attempts. 
Moreover, to represent reality is to link what is out there (objectively) to what is in 
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here (subjectively). We take what we see with our eyes, grasp in our mind, and feel in 
our gut and we codify and express “it” in language. The rub is that the world does not 
exist in the shape of the sentences we write when we theorize or express what we see, 
what we think, and what we feel (Rorty, 1989). What we come to say about the world 
involves the indistinguishable provocations of the world—what is out there—and the 
mediations of codification and language by which we make claims about it (Bochner 
and Waugh, 1995). As Bateson (1977, p. 245) observed “somewhere between objectiv-
ity and subjectivity is a region where you are partly blown by the winds of reality and 
partly an artist creating a composite out of the inner and outer events.” 
Radical interpretivists like me are sometimes called names when we say things like 
this in mixed company. When we talk about knowledge as contextual and situated, of 
the necessity of multiple description, about how people “who see things from differ-
ent points of view get tangled up in blue,” as Bob Dylan put it, our polite friends call 
us “relativists” and our not so polite friends, the “methodological fundamentalists” 
discussed by Denzin (2009. p. 25), refer to us as “solipsists.” Perhaps that is because 
they are afraid of subjectivity and jumpy about methodology. Our subjectivity is not a 
barrier between us and meaning, it is what makes meaning possible. Their resistance 
to our openness rests not on our subjectivism but on theirs. They can’t see a way to fit 
our plot into the storyline they are accustomed to living. They think that if they work 
hard enough they will reach the one right interpretation. We think there can only be a 
good interpretation for certain purposes, and that interpretation always remains con-
testable and open to conversation. They are trying to end debate; we are trying to keep 
conversation going. Gregory Bateson liked to remind his readers that the solipsist is 
ultimately isolated and alone, confined by his premise that “I make it all up.” But what 
about the opposite of solipsism? “There, at the other extreme, opposite solipsism, there 
is no choice because you could not possibly exist except as a metaphoric feather blown 
by the winds of external reality" (Brockman, 1977, p. 245). 
At Asilomar, I took the liberty to transform how I had interpreted and come to un-
derstand a Batesonian perspective on social science inquiry into the following meth-
odological guidelines (Bochner, 1981):
 1. Study life in its natural setting, being careful not to destroy the historical and 
interactional integrity of the whole setting.
 2. Think aesthetically. Visualize, analogize, compare. Look for patterns, 
configurations, figures in the rug.
 3. Live with your data. Be a detective. Mull, contemplate, inspect. Think about, 
through, and beyond.
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 4. Don’t be controlled by dogmatic formalisms about how to theorize and conduct 
research. Avoid the dualisms pronounced by particularizing methodologists and 
theorist. They’ll take their shots at you one way or the other anyhow.
 5. Be as precise as possible, but don’t close off possibilities. Look to the ever larger 
systems and configurations for your explanations. 
 6. Aim for catalytic conceptualizations; warm ideas are contagious. 
Three Decades Later 
Thirty years have passed since I wrote that paper. During the interim, many of us have 
moved at varying speeds away from modernist into postmodernist notions of social 
science. There is now a burgeoning interpretive and qualitative research community 
on an international scale. Although Gregory Bateson is not given much explicit credit 
for this transformation, he was saying long before this movement was set in motion 
that science is an ecology of mind in which the scientist lives in the same world of 
living things that he is seeking to understand. Whatever understanding we achieve is 
accomplished from inside as a participant within the processes of nature. No matter 
how hard we try to bracket our own participation in the processes of observation, we 
can never be outsiders. The idea of a detached and objective onlooker is an illusion. 
Referring to Bateson’s path-clearing epistemology as “the charm of the scout,” Stephen 
Toulmin (1981) regarded Bateson as an early prophet of postmodern science. 
Now, thirty years later, I want to take this opportunity to extend Bateson’s commu-
nicational world view to the international community of qualitative inquiry by specify-
ing a few ideas I consider crucial to the interpretive social scientist’s world view:
 1. The first is what Gregory called “open epistemology,” but which I call personal 
epistemology. It’s the idea that we all live under the illusion that we are capable of di-
rect, uncoded, un-mediated perception and experience. Bateson wrestled epistemology 
away from the confining clutches of philosophy and made it a part of natural history. 
To understand human communication we have to grant the limits of our own sensory 
capabilities. Everyone operates on the world. You do. I do. We all do. And none of us 
knows precisely how. As I mentioned above, Bateson showed that we only perceive the 
product of our perceptions, not the means by which the product is generated. 
We have yet to take seriously the consequences of mediated perception and ex-
perience. I am my own epistemology. I operate on the world from the perspective 
of an inner world constituted in that epistemology. Thus, whatever I call “truth” has 
to be akin not so much to what I perceive as to how I perceive, that is, the process of 
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perception. How I learn is who I am and what I know. Epistemology is personal be-
cause it’s a product of my senses—what I can see, touch, and feel—and that’s all I can 
know. Ironically, all we can ever understand is organized by our epistemology, yet we 
are blinded by the light. All of us have a blind spot; we don’t know how we see or un-
derstand. When we grasp the significance of open epistemology we get much closer to 
a recursive, reflexive orientation, and to recognizing the limits of lineal thinking.
 2. The enduring search for the how. From the beginning of his work as an an-
thropologist in New Guinea (Bateson, 1937) to the later work on adaptation, addic-
tion, and difference, Bateson always searched for process answers. Often his work be-
gins with one typology or another, but Bateson was quick to say that taxonomies and 
typologies are only way stations. As he put it, “The way to phrase scientific questions 
is with the word “how” and not with the word “why.” If one is interested in classifying 
persons or cultures, then one looks for the processes of interaction between persons 
that produced those differences in types. 
 3. Layers and relationships. Life is organized and organized life occurs in lay-
ers. We have messages, and messages about messages, and messages about messages 
about messages; ideas and ideas about ideas; contexts and contexts of contexts; learn-
ing and learning to learn; levels of learning, levels of context, levels of communicating; 
messages and meta-messages and meta-meta-messages. Interactional life is deeply 
embedded in issues and problems of classification and fraught with the many difficul-
ties and potentially catastrophic consequences of classification errors. To grant and 
understand the layered quality of organized life is to recognize the connections and 
patterns between the layers--connections, bridges, linkages, relationships. Perhaps the 
biggest danger is the illusion of self-contained individualism--the perils of not rec-
ognizing the realities of relatedness and interdependence. Every classification, every 
individual, every part is defined by its relation to the others. As qualitative researchers, 
we resist the hegemony of experimental, quantitative, evidence-based, and positivistic 
social science, yet the foundation of our identity is formed in relation to these Others. 
Denzin (2009) speaks of “fighting back,” of feeling “under fire” and of the “disputes” and 
“conflicts” with the scientifically based research (SBR) movement that have inspired 
the new paradigms of social justice and activist qualitative research. These differences 
make a difference. Our relation to these Others fuels our passions, helps us define our 
mission, and gives us perspective on who we are and what we want. We get in trouble, 
however, when we think the differences between “them” and “us” is something akin 
to a problem to be solved. It isn’t. As Rorty said, “these are not problems to be solved 
but differences to be lived with.” We ought to be asking not “how can we change their 
perception of us” but how can we learn to live together and appreciate the differences 
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between us. The issue is not whether they are right or we are right—we both think 
we are—but rather is the world of inquiry large enough to accommodate both of our 
interests? Aren’t there legitimate goals on both sides of the divide?
 4. This brings me to framing, which is the final point I want to introduce into 
this discussion. Bateson saw that the concept of a message framed by another message 
could not only lead to confusion but to error. The idea of a framing message implied a 
hierarchy of messages in which it appeared that one level of a message was of a higher 
order than another and that messages were confined to two levels, one of which was 
meta to the other. But in face-to-face human communication, when we are trying to 
figure out whether a message is meant as playful, ironic, teasing, or intentionally hurt-
ful, we are confronted simultaneously with verbal, visual, and vocal messages as well 
as with the context of our encounter. In these cases, there is no message per se, only 
meta-messages qualifying each other in ways that could be interpreted as congruent, 
incongruent, or conflictful. 
I doubt if there is a more fertile idea in communication theory than the idea of 
framing. In Bateson’s lecture at Asilomar, he said, “epistemological errors are part of 
the machinery of the descent into hell.” He was trying to get us to understand that the 
nature of pattern in the natural world is not something to take lightly or to fool around 
with and if we don’t respect the natural order of interdependencies we can end up 
disrupting the balances. The results can be toxic and monstrous. I end this article with 
a story that puts into perspective just how serious these ideas can be. In the events on 
which this story is based, I witnessed how catastrophic the consequences of a framing 
error could be.
Chilling Consequences of Epistemological Error
In the summer of 1985, shortly after I became chair of the Department of Commu-
nication at the University of South Florida, I attended an orientation meeting for ad-
ministrators and administrative assistants. About an hour into the meeting, a faculty 
member in my department interrupted to tell me that Ginny Bulger, a 50 year old, 
petite woman, who had been a secretary in the department for more than a decade, 
had not returned to work after lunch. Normally, this would not have been worrisome, 
but Ginny was a very punctual person who followed set routines each day. It was now 
nearly 2:30 and nobody had heard from her. When her car was located in its normal 
place in the building’s parking lot, under the shade tree where she always parked, we 
became increasingly alarmed. Over the next several hours, concern turned to distress, 
then to dread. Ginny lived with her 75 year-old mother whom she called several times 
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a day. When we contacted her, she told us she had not heard from Ginny since before 
lunch. After we searched classrooms, faculty offices, and rest rooms in the building 
for more than two hours, our worst fears were confirmed. At around 5:00 p.m., I dis-
covered Ginny’s body in a locked classroom in the rear of our office complex. She was 
laying naked on the floor, face up, her legs spread apart, and her panties tied tightly 
around her neck. Later it was determined that she had died several hours earlier. 
Panic, terror, and grief circulated chaotically through Cooper Hall as the City of 
Tampa police detectives made their way to the crime scene to begin an investigation. 
After several grueling hours of police questioning, most of us left the building still in a 
state of shock and without an inkling of the details of the events surrounding Ginny’s 
death. Later that night I was told by the detective in charge of the case that Ginny had 
been raped and murdered probably around 1:00 in the afternoon and there were no 
suspects and no leads. Except for an implausible twist of fate, it is unlikely that Ginny’s 
murderer would ever have been discovered. Here is what happened: 
At about the same time I began to read the newspaper accounts of Ginny’s mur-
der—the next morning—three male engineering students were receiving the same 
news. But their perspective was entirely different from mine. They could have pre-
vented Ginny’s murder, but they didn’t. I can only imagine how shocking it must have 
been when they realized what a colossal mistake they had made.
At the trial several months later each boy told his own version of the same story. The 
seminar room in the back hallway was a place that the engineering students often used 
as a study room when it wasn’t occupied. The three of them had walked up the fourth 
floor expecting to use the room to study for their final exam in an engineering course. 
When they got there, the door was closed and locked. One of them had walked a bit 
ahead of the others. When he found the door locked, he stood on his toes and peeked in 
the single narrow window near the top of the door. There he saw what he described as a 
fully-dressed white male holding a pair of woman’s panties in his hand and kneeling over 
a naked woman. He recognized the man in the room as a fellow engineering student who 
was in one of his classes. Almost immediately he turned to his two friends and said, “You 
have to see this to believe it. Wow, it’s a couple of co-eds making whoopee in the middle 
of the afternoon.” In turn each of his two friends took a quick glance into the room, each 
shaking his head in disbelief. Neither questioned the interpretation of the first guy. They 
thought they were witnessing risqué sex. Not wanting to interrupt the party, one of the 
men suggested that they go to the second floor to study and the three of them left the 
scene. At the trial, the coroner reported the results of an autopsy that showed Ginny had 
been knocked unconscious but was still alive at the time these three men peeped into the 
room. They could have saved her life had it not been for their profound epistemological 
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error. We can only theorize about what made them abstract the signals they witnessed 
into the frame of risqué sex and not into the frame of rape and/or murder. They never 
questioned their assumptions, never considered the possibility that some darker scene 
was being played out, never suspected that a fully dressed male standing over a naked 
woman could have been a rapist rather than a lover.
At Asilomar Gregory Bateson ended his talk by recalling a quotation from one of 
the Nazis at Nuremberg who had been asked “Did you know what was happening in 
the death camps?” “No, I did not know,” he replied, “but I could have known.” For the 
past twenty-four years, every time I recall what happened that day I am reminded that 
those three boys didn’t know. Then, I hear a voice, wavering between anger and sad-
ness, whispering in my ear, “Surely they could have known, surely they could have.” 
acknowledgment
The author acknowledges the assistance of Carolyn Ellis whose keen eye and thought-
ful commentary contributed significantly to this project.
references
Bateson, G. (1937). Naven. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bateson, G. (1951). Information and codification: A philosophical approach. In J. Ruesch & G. 
Bateson (Eds.) Communication: The social matrix of psychiatry (pp. 168–211). New York: 
Norton. 
Bateson, G. (1951). Conventions of communication: Where validity depends upon belief. In J 
Ruesch & G. Bateson (Eds.) Communication: The social matrix of psychiatry. (pp. 212–227). 
New York: Norton. 
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. New York: Ballentine Books.
Bateson, G. (1977). Afterward. In J. Brockman (Ed.) About Bateson (pp. 235–247) New York: 
Dutton.
Bateson, G. (1981). Paradigmatic conservatism. In C. Wilder Mott & J. Weakland (eds.) Essays 
from the Legacy of Gregory Bateson (pp. 347–355). Palo Alto, Ca.: Praeger. 
Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1967). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of 
knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.
Brockman, J. (Ed.) (1977). About Bateson. New York: Dutton.
Bochner, A. (1981). Forming warm ideas. In C. Wilder-Mott and J. Weakland. (eds.) Rigor and 
Imagination: Essays from the Legacy of Gregory Bateson, (pp. 65–81). Palo Alto, Ca.: Pra-
eger. 
Bochner, A. & Waugh, J. (1995). Talking-with as a model for writing about: Implications of 
Rortian pragmatism for communication Theory. In L. Langsdorf and A. Smith (Eds.) Reco-
vering pragmatism’s voice: The classical tradition and the philosophy of communication (pp. 
211–233). New York: SUNY Press.
370  arthur P. Bochner
Denzin, N. (2009). Qualitative inquiry under fire: Toward a new paradigm dialogue. Walnut 
Creek, Ca.: Left Coast Press.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson.
Gergen, K. (2009). Relational being: Beyond self and community. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor.
Goffman, E. (1967). Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. Garden City, N.Y.: An-
chor.
Haley, J. (1963). Strategies of psychotherapy. New York: Grune and Stratton.
Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: A general introduction to pure phenomenology, 1913. (W. R. Boyce 
Gibson, Trans.). New York: Humanities Press.
Harding, S. (1991). Whose science?  Whose knowledge? Thinking from women’s lives.  Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press. 
Harding, S. (Ed.) (2004). The feminist standpoint theory reader. New York: Routledge. 
Philipsen, G. (1975). Speaking ‘like a man’ in Teamsterville: Culture patterns of role enactment 
in an urban neighborhood. Quarterly Journal of Speech (61) pp.13–22.
Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.
Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, relativism and truth: Philosophical papers, Volume I. Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press.
Taylor, C. (1971). Interpretation and the sciences of man, Review of Metaphysics, (25) pp. 3–51.
Thibaut, J. & Kelley, H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley. 
Wilder-Mott, C. & Weakland, J. (Eds.) (1981). Rigor and imagination: Essays from the legacy of 
Gregory Bateson. Palo Alto, Ca.: Praeger. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. (Trans. G. Anscombe). New York: Macmil-
lan.
About the Author
arthur P. Bochner is distinguished Professor of communication at the university of south Florida. 
in 2008, he served as the President of the national communication association (nca).  he is 
the author of more than 80 published articles and chapters and co-editor of the left coast Book 
series "writing lives: ethnographic narratives." Portions of this article are taken from a. Bochner, 
Tales Out of School:  Meaning and Method in a University Life, left coast Press (forthcoming). 
